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Abstract
Background: Utilization of healthcare in Ghana’s novel National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) has been
increasing since inception with associated high claims bill which threatens the scheme’s financial sustainability.
This paper investigates the presence of adverse selection by assessing the effect of healthcare utilization and
frequency of use on NHIS renewal.
Method: Routine enrolment and utilization data from 2008 to 2013 in two regions in Ghana was analyzed.
Pearson Chi-square test was performed to test if the proportion of insured who utilize healthcare in a particular
year and renew membership the following year is significantly different from those who utilize healthcare and
drop-out. Logistic regressions were estimated to examine the relationship between healthcare utilization and
frequency of use in previous year and NHIS renewal in current year.
Results: We found evidence suggestive of the presence of adverse selection in the NHIS. Majority of insured who
utilized healthcare renewed their membership whiles most of those who did not utilize healthcare dropped out.
The likelihood of renewal was significantly higher for those who utilize healthcare than those who did not and
also higher for those who make more health facility visits.
Conclusion: The NHIS claims bill is high because high risk individuals who self-select into the scheme makes
more health facility visits and creates financial sustainability problems. Policy makers should adopt pragmatic
ways of enforcing mandatory enrolment so that low risk individuals remain enrolled; and sustainable ways of
increasing revenue whiles ensuring that the societal objectives of the scheme are not compromised.
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Background
Introduction
Most low and middle income countries have been facing
challenges of raising revenues for financing essential
healthcare services. Over the past two to three decades,
many sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have found it
increasingly difficult to mobilize sufficient funds for
financing health care particularly for the poor and
vulnerable in society. The WHO in 2005 passed a reso-
lution to support any of its member states, especially
low income countries who develop strategies to mobilize
more resources for healthcare through risk pooling to
improve access to healthcare for the poor and deliver
quality healthcare [1]. Some SSA countries responded to
this call by focusing on social health insurance (SHI)
schemes and since then interest in SHI has gained
strength in SSA as shown by efforts in Kenya, Lesotho,
Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ghana in implementing
SHI schemes. Available empirical evidence indicates that
these SHI schemes have provided financial protection to
the poor and vulnerable in terms of reducing out-of-
pocket expenditures and also improving utilization of
both inpatient and outpatient care [2, 3]. Most of these
SHI schemes are however facing challenges such as low
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enrolment coverages, poor quality of healthcare services,
inefficient provider payment mechanisms, high claims
bill, moral hazard and adverse selection which have the
potential of eroding the gains made [2, 3]. The need to
critically investigate these challenges, particularly ad-
verse selection and find policy solutions to them, is more
relevant now than ever.
In 2004, Ghana started full implementation of the
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). The NHIS
was established with the aim of making quality health-
care accessible and affordable to all people living in
Ghana, particularly the poor and vulnerable. To protect
vulnerable populations, the NHIS has an exemption pol-
icy that exempts children under 18 years, elderly aged
70 years and above, Social Security and National Insur-
ance Trust (SSNIT) contributors and pensioners, preg-
nant women, Indigents and Livelihood Empowerment
Against Poverty (LEAP) beneficiaries from the payment
of annual premium. After a decade of NHIS implemen-
tation, available statistics indicates that the scheme has
made some progress towards this aim. Active membership
increased from 1,348,160 in 2005 to 10,638,119 in 2009.
Active membership however decreased to 8,163,714 in
2010 and increased to 8,885,757 in 2012, an increase of
8 % over the 2011 figure of 8,227,823 and representing
35 % of the Ghanaian population [4].
Out-patients visit increased over forty fold from 0.6 mil-
lion visits in 2005 to 16.9 million visits in 2010 and to 25.5
million visits in 2011. It however decreased slightly to 23.9
million visits in 2012. In-patient utilization also increased
more than thirty-fold from 28,906 admissions in 2005 to
724,440 admissions in 2010 and to 1,451,596 admissions
in 2011. In-patient utilization however decreased to
1,428.192 admissions in 2012. These increases in out-
patients and in-patients utilization rates were accompan-
ied by increases in the claims bill over the same period.
Claims bill increased from GH 7.60 million in 2005 to
GH 616.47 million in 2012 representing 78.2 % of the
total NHIS expenditure of GH 788.32 million as against
total revenue of GH 773.83 million resulting in a net op-
erating deficit of 14.49 million for 2012 which is financed
through borrowing from banks [4]. This high claims bill
that threatens the future financial sustainability of the
scheme is expected to rise even further in the coming
years. The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA)
attributes the high claims bill to increasing number of ac-
tive members and moral hazard associated with insurance
schemes. To contain the increasing claims bill, the NHIA
in 2012, strengthened the clinical and Internal Audit
Division, linked treatments to diagnosis, piloted a new
prescription form with the intention to deploy it across
the country, established Claims Processing Centers and
introduced capitation as an additional provider payment
mechanism [4]. These measures were put in place to
reduce inefficiencies and fraud associated with claims pro-
cessing and the insurance system as a whole.
Recent empirical studies have established a positive
relationship between health insurance coverage and in-
creased utilization of healthcare services. These studies
indicate that health insurance reduces out-of-pocket
expenditure and increases access and utilization of for-
mal healthcare, particularly for those in the poorest
wealth quintile who need healthcare most [5–7]. Al-
though by design the NHIS is supposed to be mandatory
for all people living in Ghana, in practice it is voluntary
because there is no legal enforcement, making the
scheme susceptible to adverse selection. The NHIS law
stipulates that the premium of scheme members shall be
determined by the NHIA board in consultation with the
Minister of health and take into account the social na-
ture of the scheme (Section 28 sub-section 3, NHIS Act
852) [8]. However, the premium for each district is set
based on the socio-economic characteristics of that dis-
trict without due consideration to the risk levels such
that both high and low risk individuals are offered the
same premium. Whiles formal sector employees who are
SSNIT contributors are exempted from premium and
therefore pay only a small registration fee to enrol, infor-
mal sector employees pay the premium plus the registra-
tion fees. Thus the premium paid by low risk individuals
may exceed the actuarially fair levels for their risk status
whiles that paid by high risk individuals may be lower
than the fair levels for their risk status. Although the
funding arrangements under the NHIS is such that all
residents in Ghana who consume Value Added Tax
(VAT) taxable goods and services make a 2.5 % contri-
bution of the value of the good or service consumed to
the NHIS fund, and the government also allocates funds
to the NHIS fund through parliament, one of the prom-
inent challenges of the NHIS currently is the lack of
funds which has resulted in the consistent indebtedness
to health care providers.
The steep increase in the out-patient and in-patient
utilization rates with its associated increase in claims
bills are suggestive of the presence of adverse selection
in the NHIS. Adverse selection is the situation where
only individuals with known underlying health condi-
tions and high expected propensity of healthcare usage
self-select into insurance schemes [9]. This paper seeks
to ascertain the presence of adverse selection in the
NHIS. The NHIS enrolment and utilization data from
2008 to 2013 in the Greater Accra and Western regions
of Ghana was used to establish the relationship between
utilization of healthcare services by NHIS subscribers
and renewal of membership in subsequent years. That is,
once individuals enroll, does utilization of health services
have any effect on their decision to renew membership?
Thus far there is paucity of studies that use actuarial data
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to establish the prevalence of adverse selection in Ghana’s
NHIS. The paper fills this gap in the literature and also
contribute to the literature on social health insurance in
resource constraint countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We review
empirical literature on the effect of health insurance up-
take on healthcare utilisation and the problem of adverse
selection. This is followed by a discussion of the concep-
tual framework for the paper. A description of the data
and statistical methods employed for the analysis is then
presented, followed by the presentation of results of the
statistical analysis. The results are then discussed with
some conclusions and policy recommendations.
Literature review
Theoretically, insurance coverage is expected to affect
individuals’ behavior through several distinct mecha-
nisms. The first is what is known in the economic litera-
ture as the moral hazard problem, where insurance
coverage make individuals feel safe and adopt more risky
behaviors and lifestyles with associated increase in
healthcare utilization. The second is when insurance
coverage makes orthodox medical treatment cheaper for
rational decision makers than other forms of treatment
and hence changes the choices they normally would have
made in the event of health problems towards increased
utilization of orthodox healthcare services [9–11]. Third,
is the problem of adverse selection, which is the tendency
of individuals to avoid taking up health insurance unless
they are sure of an underlying health problem with a high
propensity of healthcare utilization. This results in the
situation where only the sick end up enrolling in health in-
surance with its consequences on increased utilization
and cost [12]. Finally, individuals would want to make use
of health services as a way of recovering part of the insur-
ance premium paid. This behavior has been well explained
in models of loss aversion by Kahnemann & Tversky [13].
Empirically, several studies have been conducted in
developed economies to assess the effect of insurance
uptake on healthcare utilization behavior through any of
the mechanisms described above [14–17]. The evidence
from these studies are that health insurance coverage
leads to increased healthcare utilization. In the develop-
ing world, some studies have also been conducted that
provide empirical evidence of a positive relationship be-
tween insured status and increased healthcare utilization
[2, 3, 16–19]. In Ghana specifically, a number of studies
have been conducted that provide evidence of a positive
relationship between insurance coverage and increased
healthcare utilization [7, 11, 20]. The missing link how-
ever in the Ghanaian context is whether increased
healthcare use once enrolled has an effect on the deci-
sion to renew enrolment and suggestive of the presence
of adverse selection.
Adverse selection has been extensively studied in de-
veloped countries with a focus on employer and govern-
ment insurance schemes [9, 21–26]. In the developing
world, the phenomenon of adverse selection has been
studied in greater detail with mixed findings. Whiles
some of these studies [25, 27, 28] found evidence of the
presence of adverse selection, others [28–31] found no
evidence of the presence of adverse selection in the
schemes they investigated. In Ghana, since the imple-
mentation of the NHIS in 2005, to the best of our know-
ledge only two studies have examined the problem of
adverse selection. Rajkotia & Frick [32] tested for the
presence of adverse selection in the NHIS in Nkoronza
district in the Brong Ahafo Region in Ghana after the
district scheme introduced a premium waiver for all
children less than 18 years in exchange for full house-
hold enrolment as a way of discouraging households
from selectively enrolling their sickest (high-risk) mem-
bers. They found that household enrolment cost was
positively correlated with the number of children in the
household and the odds and intensity of outpatient use
by children. They concluded that child premium waiver
is an important incentive for household enrolment and
provides evidence suggestive that adverse selection has
effectively been contained but not eliminated. Another
study by Amponsah [33] tested for the presence of ad-
verse selection, moral hazard, and income effect in the
NHIS. He found that after controlling for selection bias,
the likelihood of purchasing health insurance increases
with health risk which is evident of adverse selection.
Although these studies provide empirical evidence of
the presence of adverse selection in health insurance in
Ghana, they used datasets that spans one and two pe-
riods of time respectively. Whiles Rajkotia & Frick [32]
used the enrolment and claims database of Nkoronsa
district NHIS from August 2005 to July 2006, Amponsah
[33] used the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS)
waves IV and V, conducted by the Ghana Statistical
Service (GSS) in 1998/99 and 2005/06. This study how-
ever, uses routine enrolment and utilization database of
the NHIS from two regions in Ghana that spans a period
of 6 years from 2008 to 2013 to assess healthcare
utilization by insured clients and its effect on renewal of
insurance membership and ascertain the presence of
adverse selection in the NHIS.
Conceptual framework
Rational, risk averse individuals are expected to enrol in
the NHIS to protect themselves from catastrophic health
expenditure in the event of ill health. However, once en-
rolled, there is the likelihood for high risk individuals to
utilise health services more than low risk individuals due
to the underlying poor health conditions. Over time, low
risk individuals who enrol but make little or no use of
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health services may drop out of the insurance scheme
because they feel they are not benefiting from the pre-
mium paid, leaving only high risk individuals in the in-
surance pool which may lead to the problem of adverse
selection and its associated high claims bill. The expect-
ation is that healthcare utilisation of insured in a par-
ticular year will be positively associated with the renewal
decision in the following year. Thus enrolled individuals
who utilize healthcare in previous year will renew their
membership in current year if adverse selection is
present in the NHIS.
Willingness to renew NHIS membership depends on
several factors one of which is the prior knowledge of
health status. Health status will influence NHIS renewal
such that those in good health are unlikely to renew
whiles those of poor health are most likely to renew.
Healthcare utilization was used as a proxy to measure
health status, where a health facility visit in a particular
year for curative services of which the NHIS reimburses
the healthcare provider is taken as relatively poor health
status and no health facility visit is taken as relatively
good health status [32]. Secondly, the intensity of health
services usage once enrolled will influence NHIS renewal
such that those who visited a health facility once (high-
risk) or more than once (very high-risk) are more likely
to renew their membership whiles those who did not
visit a health facility (low-risk) may drop out [32]. The
effect of healthcare utilization on the renewal decision is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
From Fig. 1, we hypothesize that enrolling in the NHIS
and utilizing healthcare (at least once a year) would
most likely lead to renewal of NHIS membership in the
following year (Outcome 1). We further hypothesize that
enrolling in the NHIS and not utilizing healthcare in
that year would most likely lead to drop out of the
NHIS. The presence of adverse selection will be evident
if over time, the same individuals who enroll and utilize
healthcare renew their membership.
Methods
Data
This study is part of a larger research, called the Client-
Oriented Health Insurance System in Ghana (COHEi-
SION) Project which is funded by the Netherlands Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs and the Science for Global
Development (WOTRO), under the Global Health Policy
and Systems Research (GHPHSR) programme. The
study was conducted in the Greater Accra and Western
regions in Ghana. The Greater Accra Region with the
capital city of Ghana, Accra, has a largely urban popula-
tion of about 4 million accounting for 16.3 % of the
national population. The Western region has a predom-
inantly rural population of about 2 million representing
9.6 % of the national population [34]. These two regions
provided the rural/urban balance for the Project in
terms of population and socio-economic activities. Only
the NHIS enrolment and utilization data for Greater
Accra and Western regions was released to the COHEi-
SION Project for this paper because the NHIA data
availability policy does not allow the release of patient
level data of more than two regions to third parties.
The enrolment data consisted of individuals enrolled
in the NHIS in these two regions from 2008 to 2013,
and the utilization data consisted of NHIS subscribers
who visited accredited health facilities at least once in
these two regions from 2008 to 2012. These two data
Fig. 1 Conceptual framework of effect of healthcare utilization on Insurance renewal
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sets contained information on unique NHIS member
identification (ID) number, name of subscriber, date of
birth, sex, scheme code, community code, community
name, phone number, first enrolment date, enrolment
end date, premium exemption category, dates of health-
care service usage, total cost per healthcare usage and
utilized services claims date.
Stata version 12.1 was used to set the data up for ana-
lysis. The enrolment and utilization data were separated
into the specific years (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and
2013). The enrolment data was then cleaned by drop-
ping all duplicate observations for the specific years
since no individual is expected to register more than
once in a specific year in the NHIS data. Thus for each
year, using the NHIS ID number as the unique identifier,
any individual whose NHIS ID and name appears more
than once, was treated as a duplicated registration. The
duplicates were therefore dropped leaving only one
NHIS ID and name for that individual in the data. For
the Utilization data, since an individual can make more
than one health facility visit in a particular year, it con-
tained a lot of duplicate observations. A utilization rate
variable that counted the number of times an individual
visited a health facility in a particular year was generated.
After generating this variable, all duplicate observations
were dropped to obtain the number of individuals who
visited health facilities in a particular year with their corre-
sponding rates of utilization captured by the utilization
rate variable.
The enrolment data of a particular year was then
merged with the utilization data of the same year for all
the years using their unique NHIS membership identifi-
cation numbers. Individuals in the enrolment data that
matched with their membership identification numbers
in the utilization data constituted those who visited
health facilities in that particular year and those that did
not match constituted those who were insured but did
not make any health facility visit. A utilization variable
was generated using the match code obtained from the
stata merging command. This dichotomous variable was
assigned a value of 1 if the individual visited a health fa-
cility in that year and 0 if otherwise. To obtain the NHIS
renewal in subsequent years, the data obtained after
merging the enrolment and utilization data for a particu-
lar year was merged with the enrolment data of the fol-
lowing year (e.g. merged 2008 enrolment and utilization
data will be merged with 2009 enrolment data). This was
done for all the years in the data set. A complete match
was not obtained since not all insured individuals in a
particular year renewed their membership the following
year. Individuals in a particular year whose membership
numbers matched their membership numbers in the fol-
lowing year’s enrolment data constituted renewals and
those that did not match constituted those who did not
renew. A renewal variable was then generated using the
match code obtained from the stata merging command.
This dichotomous variable was equal to 1 if the individ-
ual renewed membership and 0 if otherwise. Other vari-
ables in the data such as sex and region of residence
were also dichotomized before analysis.
Statistical analysis
The percentage of NHIS enrolment over the 6 years
period was assessed for males and females; for five age
groups (children under one year, children 1–17 years,
adults 18–39, ageing adults 40–59 years and the elderly
above 60 years) and for the different enrolment categor-
ies to understand the pattern of enrolment among the
premium paying members and dependents for the differ-
ent age groups and among exempted categories. The
proportion of insured utilizing healthcare services over
the same period was also examined. Pearson chi-square
test was performed to test if the proportion of insured
utilizing healthcare at different frequencies in a particu-
lar year and renewing membership in the following year
is significantly different from those utilizing healthcare
at different frequencies and dropping out.
Finally, logistic regressions were estimated to examine
the relationship between healthcare utilization in previ-
ous year and NHIS renewal in current year. Two com-
ponents of healthcare utilization which are health facility
visit irrespective of the number; and the number of
health facility visits, conditioned on a particular year’s
utilization were used. The first logistic regression esti-
mation assessed the relationship between NHIS renewal
in current year and health facility visit in previous year.
The second logistic regression estimation assessed the
relationship between NHIS renewal in current year and
the number of healthcare facility visits in the previous
year. These estimations were run for all the years. A
positive relationship in both estimations will suggest the
presence of adverse selection in the NHIS. Thus individ-
uals who utilize healthcare services most are more likely
to renew their NHIS membership in subsequent years.
Results
Demographic characteristics and NHIS enrolment
Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics and
NHIS enrolment of subscribers. Out of the total number
of enrollees in the two regions, the percentage living in
the Greater Accra region was higher (more than 53 %)
than the percentage living in the Western region (less
than 43 %) for all the years (2008–2013). The NHIS has
a relatively youthful membership (least mean age of
24 years for 2008 & 2013) with a higher proportion of
them (least 58 % for 2008) being females in all the years.
NHIS coverage for the two regions saw a steady increase
from 939,559 members in 2008 to 2,207,459 in 2013
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representing a 2.35 fold increase of the 2008 figure as
compared to the national coverage that saw an increase
from 9,914,256 members in 2008 to 10,145,196 members
in 2013 representing a 1.02 fold increase of the 2008
figure. The percentage of insured renewing their mem-
bership in the two regions increased from 16.11 % in
2009 to 40.13 % in 2013 as compared to the national es-
timates which increased from a 43.65 % renewals in
2010 to 75.41 % renewals in 2013 [35–37]. In terms of
age strata, children between the ages of 1–17 and young
adults between the ages of 18–39 formed the majority of
enrollees for all the years in the two regions. For enrol-
ment categories, children under 18 years exemption cat-
egory (least 37 for 2009 and highest 45 % for 2012)
formed the majority of enrollees in all the years over the
6 year (2008–2013) period. This is quite similar to the
national estimates where the children in the under
18 years exemptions category have always constituted
the highest proportion of enrollees from 49.4 % in 2009
to 46.5 % in 2013 [35–37].
Healthcare utilization
Healthcare utilization pattern of the insured are summa-
rized in Table 2 and Fig. 2. Health facility visits increased
from 12,270 in 2008 involving 8,261 individuals to 168,602
in 2010 involving 108,124 individuals. The utilization rate
however declined to 75,633 visits in 2011 involving 50,731
individuals and dropped even further to 8,870 visits in
2012 involving 7,476 individuals (Table 2). The percentage
of insured utilizing healthcare also increased from 0.9 % in
2008 to 7.8 % in 2010. It then dropped to 2.9 in 2011 and
dropped even further to 0.4 % in 2012 (Fig. 2).
In terms of frequency of healthcare utilization, the mean
annual number of health facility visits was less than 2 in all















Females (%) 57.82 58.68 58.96 59.04 59.05 58.24
Mean Age (years) 24.10 (19.73) 27.07 (20.04) 26.31 (20.35) 25.53 (20.19) 24.74 (20.20) 24.04 (20.06)
Greater Accra Region (%) 57.38 60.71 53.84 58.38 57.87 57.06
Western Region (%) 42.62 39.29 46.16 41.62 42.13 42.94
NHIS Enrolment
Total Number Insured 939559 1045072 1384588 1753000 2079141 2207459
Number New Registrants 876655 1007219 1120036 1267786 1321657
Number Renewals 168417 377369 632964 811355 885802
Percentage New Registrants 83.89 72.75 63.89 60.98 59.87
Percentage Renewals 16.11 27.25 36.11 39.02 40.13
NHIS Enrolment by Age
Babies Under One year (%) 4.53 0.80 0.98 1.36 2.02 2.20
Children 1–17 years (%) 39.66 38.65 41.40 42.32 43.45 46.00
Adults 18–39 years (%) 29.78 36.36 33.65 33.64 32.45 30.86
Ageing Adults 40–59 years (%) 13.08 15.70 15.55 14.91 14.45 13.91
Elderly Above 60 year (%) 12.95 8.48 8.42 7.76 7.63 7.03
NHIS Enrolment by Category
Informal Employees (%) 33.29 35.33 36.47 37.77 36.81 32.96
Children under 18 Years (%) 42.02 37.49 40.88 42.37 44.61 43.52
70 Years & Above (%) 4.05 4.89 4.68 4.03 3.58 3.14
SSNIT Contributors (%) 15.29 12.95 11.48 10.55 9.64 9.97
SSNIT Pensioner (%) 0.52 0.52 0.43 0.35 0.29 0.26
Indigent (%) 4.61 8.47 5.60 4.30 4.39 9.62
Pregnant Woman (%) 0.20 0.33 0.44 0.61 0.66 0.51
LEAP (%) 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Source: NHIA Enrolment Data from 2008 – 2013. Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis
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the years. The year 2008 recorded the lowest of 1.13 with a
standard deviation of 0.42 visits whiles the highest of 1.56
with a standard deviation of 1.20 visits was recorded in
2010. Majority of insured (lowest 70 in 2010 and highest
89 % in 2008) who utilized healthcare in each year made
only one health facility visit whiles a small proportion(least
0.01 in 2008 and 2012 and highest 1.99 % in 2011) made
more than 5 health facility visits. The lowest mean annual
cost of health facility visit was GH 13.84 ($8.36) in 2011
with a standard deviation of GH 19.15 ($11.56) and the
highest of GH 18.83 ($4.92) in 2009 with a standard devi-
ation of GH 52.57 ($36.21) (Table 2).
Table 2 Healthcare utilization
Year
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012




939559 1045072 1384588 1753000 2079141
Total Count of
Service Utilization








0.88 4.63 7.81 2.89 0.35
Frequency of Health Services Utilization
Percentage with
one visit
89.30 79.07 70.00 74.62 84.83
Percentage with
two visits
8.84 15.11 18.06 15.05 12.32
Percentage with
three visits
1.45 3.89 6.06 4.96 2.33
Percentage with
four visits
0.29 1.23 2.64 2.18 0.43
Percentage with five
visits
0.11 0.42 1.33 1.19 0.08
Percentage with
more than five visits







1.56 (1.20) 1.49 (1.17) 1.19 (0.49)






17.56 (31.52) 13.84 (19.15) 17.04 (26.17)
Source: NHIA Utilization Data from 2008 – 2012. Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis
Fig. 2 Percentage of Enrolled Utilizing Services per Year
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Effect of healthcare utilization on NHIS renewals
Table 3 presents the results of Pearson chi-square test
on healthcare utilization and frequency of use and NHIS
renewals. Generally, the proportion of insured that uti-
lized healthcare and renewed NHIS membership (lowest
43 in 2009 and highest 60 % in 2010) was found to be
statistically significantly (p-value = 0.000) higher than the
proportion that did not utilize healthcare (lowest 18 in
2009 and highest 46 % in 2012) and renewed their mem-
bership. Similarly, the proportion of insured that did not
utilize healthcare and dropped-out of the NHIS (lowest
54 in 2012 and highest 82 % in 2009) was also found to
be statistically significantly higher than the proportion
that utilized healthcare and dropped-out (lowest 40 in
2010 and highest 57 % in 2009). The proportion of in-
sured that utilized healthcare and renewed their NHIS
membership increases with increasing frequency of
health facility visits. A higher proportion of those that
made 4 health facility visits renewed their member-
ship than those that made 2 health facility visits. For
those who made four health facility visits, 63, 74, 60,
60 and 34 % renewed their NHIS membership in the
years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively as
compared to 44, 62, 57 56 and 46 % for those who
made two health facility visits in the years 2009,
2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively and renewed their
NHIS membership.
For the years 2009 and 2013, there was 100 % drop
out respectively for those who made more than 5 health
facility visits. However, a close examination of the abso-
lute figures indicates that only single individuals were
involved respectively. These individuals might have died
from chronic medical conditions that compelled them
to make such high health facility visits and were there-
fore not alive to renew their membership. The NHIS
routine data does not capture such drop-outs due to
death.
Table 4 presents the logistic regression estimates of
the effect of health facility visit on NHIS renewal.
Generally, the insured who visited a health facility in
a particular year were found to be significantly more
likely (odds ratio = 1.66, 2.62, 1.83, 1.91, & 2.08 for
the years 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 & 2013 respectively)
to renew their NHIS membership the following year
than those who did not visit a health facility. Females,
children under 1 year, the 70+ year exemption group,
SSNIT pensioners, SSNIT contributors, pregnant
women and people living in the Greater Accra region
were also found to be more likely at varying extents
to renew NHIS membership. All these findings were
statistically significant at the 95 % confidence level.
Finally, Table 5 presents the logistic regression esti-
mates of the effect of frequency of health facility visits
on NHIS renewal. We found that those who utilized
healthcare most are more likely to renew their NHIS
membership than those who do not utilize healthcare.
Increases in the frequency of healthcare usage were
accompanied by corresponding statistically significant
increases in the likelihood of NHIS renewal for the
years 2010, 2011 and 2012. However, only one visit
(1.68) and two visits (1.61) for 2009; and for 2013 only
one visit (2.14), two visits (1.76) and three visits (1.65)
respectively had statistically significant likelihood of
renewal in the NHIS (see Table 5).
Table 3 Healthcare utilization and NHIS renewals
NHIS renewal status


































Utilized Service 57.20 42.80 *** 39.89 60.11 *** 43.34 56.66 *** 42.59 57.41 *** 49.29 50.71 ***
Did Not Utilize 82.13 17.87 64.71 35.29 55.23 44.77 54.05 45.95 57.43 42.57
Total 81.91 18.09 63.58 36.42 54.32 45.68 53.73 46.27 57.40 42.60
Frequency
No Visit 82.13 17.87 *** 64.71 35.29 *** 55.23 44.77 *** 54.05 45.95 *** 57.43 42.57 ***
one visit 57.35 42.65 40.99 59.01 43.88 56.12 42.80 57.20 48.27 51.73
two visits 55.75 44.25 37.56 62.44 42.77 57.23 43.70 56.30 53.64 46.36
three visits 60.00 40.30 33.62 66.38 42.19 57.81 41.99 58.01 59.77 40.23
four visits 37.50 62.50 25.92 74.08 40.29 59.71 39.91 60.09 65.63 34.38
five visits 55.56 44.44 27.23 72.77 40.93 59.07 37.02 62.98 66.67 33.33
> five visits 100.00 0.00 22.86 77.14 38.55 61.45 34.09 65.91 100.00 0.00
Source: NHIA Enrolment Data from 2008 – 2013; NHIA Utilization Data from 2008 – 2012; Note: Absolute figures in parenthesis; *** p < 0.001
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Discussion
The results from the enrolment and utilization pattern
suggest that just as the enrolment coverage has been in-
creasing over the years since the inception of the NHIS,
so has the total count of health facility visits as well as
the number of individuals making those visits. However,
the proportion of insured who utilized healthcare in any
given year over the 6 years period never exceeded 8 %. If
this is the case, why then is the NHIS claims bill out-
stripping its revenue? According to the NHIS, the claims
bill increased from 183.01 million Ghana Cedis in 2008
to 548.71 million Ghana Cedis in 2011 representing
88.82 % of total revenue from all sources for 2011 and
increased even further in 2012 to 616.47 million Ghana
Cedis representing 79.66 % of the total NHIS revenue
from all sources for that year [37]. This means that al-
though a very small proportion of the insured in any
given year utilize healthcare, the claims bill from this
utilization is always in excess of 80 % of NHIS revenue.
While acknowledging that excessive utilization by the in-
sured is a cost-driver, it is also obvious that false claims
and fraud perpetuated by some NHIS staff in collusion
with healthcare providers as reported by the NHIS [4] is
also to blame for the high unsustainable claims bill
which threatens the future of the scheme.
The chi-square test results also suggest that over the
years, majority of insured who do not utilize healthcare
drop out of the scheme whiles those who utilize health-
care renew their membership. An even higher propor-
tion of the insured who makes more health facility visits
in any particular year renew their membership as com-
pared to those who do not utilize healthcare in that year.
Again the likelihood of renewal was higher for those
who utilize healthcare than those who do not and also
higher for those who make more health facility visits
than those who do not. This is suggestive of the pres-
ence of adverse selection in the NHIS. This finding is in
line with Cutler’s assertion that “almost all health insur-
ance systems where individuals are allowed choice of
insurance have experienced adverse selection” [38]. The
possible explanation for this phenomenon is that once
people enroll and utilize healthcare, those with under-
lying medical conditions (high risk individuals) become
aware of their conditions and the need for future health-
care consumption. Even those who are not insured but
realize they have chronic conditions and cannot afford
out-of-pocket payment for their frequent healthcare con-
sumption, enroll in the NHIS with the expectation that
they will be able to access healthcare with their NHIS
card at the next visit within the 3 months waiting period.
Since the NHIS annual premium is set without consider-
ation to health risk levels, high risk and low risk individ-
uals pay the same amount of premium. This makes it
expedient for high risk individuals with knowledge of
Table 4 Effect of previous year’s healthcare utilization on NHIS renewal
Year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Odds Odds Odds Odds Odds
Healthcare Utilization Utilized Healthcare in Previous Year 1.66*** 2.62*** 1.83*** 1.91*** 2.08***
Sex Male 0.99 0.92*** 0.95*** 0.92*** 0.92***
Age Group Age1–17 Years 0.99 0.89*** 0.86*** 1.11*** 1.18***
Age 18–39 0.53*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.56*** 0.43***
Age 40–59 0.69*** 0.44*** 0.59*** 0.98 0.77***
Age 60+ 0.19*** 0.55*** 0.73*** 1.28*** 0.85***
Enrolment Categories Children under 18 Years 0.53*** 0.47*** 0.70*** 0.99 0.74***
70 Years & Above 5.11*** 1.28*** 1.24*** 1.29*** 1.56***
SSNIT Contributor 1.24*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.65*** 1.73***
SSNIT Pensioner 5.43*** 1.67*** 2.25*** 2.22*** 2.80***
Indigent 0.67*** 0.27*** 0.44*** 0.62*** 0.94***
Pregnant Woman 1.68*** 1.88*** 1.68*** 1.44*** 1.32***
LEAP 0.34** 1.65** 1.02 1.33* 1.15
Region Greater Accra 1.32*** 0.87*** 1.09*** 0.83*** 0.62***
Constant 0.37*** 1.67*** 1.54*** 1.09*** 1.39***
Number of observations 834487 997544 1298711 1644807 1965649
Source: NHIS Enrolment and Utilisation Data for the years 2008 – 2013
Note: Odds ratio are reported with reference Categories; Healthcare Utilization (Did not utilized healthcare in previous year); Sex (Female); Age Group (Babies
under 1 Year); Enrolment Categories (Informal Sector Employees). Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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their underlying health conditions to enroll/renew their
membership to avoid paying out-of-pocket the high cost
of healthcare any time they visit a health facility. On the
other hand, low risk individuals who do not utilize health-
care feel they are not making use of the premium paid
and therefore drop out of the NHIS thereby creating a
situation where most of those who utilize healthcare re-
new their membership whiles those who do not utilize
healthcare drop-out.
These findings are consistent with findings by Rajkotia
& Frick [32] and Amponsah [33] that provided evidence
of the presence of adverse selection in the NHIS. It is fur-
ther in line with the conclusion by Rajkotia & Frick [32]
that the design of the NHIS to offer premium exemptions
to children, the aged 70+ years, pregnant women and vul-
nerable groups such as indigents and LEAP beneficiaries
in a way has largely contained but not eliminated adverse
selection. The granting of exemptions was partly to con-
tain adverse selection by ensuring that both high and low
risk individuals are enrolled. There is evidence that ad-
verse selection can be contained this way and has been
demonstrated in a study in micro insurance in China by
Wang et al. [27]. They found that offering household en-
rolment reduces adverse selection by bringing into the in-
surance pool those low risk members of the household
who would not otherwise enroll if the insurance was
offered at the individual level. However, this aim of
containing adverse selection in the NHIS has not been
fully achieved because although by design the NHIS is
mandatory for all people living in Ghana, in practice it is
voluntary because there is no legal enforcement, making it
possible for low risk individuals to opt out living high risk
individuals mostly from the exemption groups in the in-
surance pool. Other studies from community-based health
insurance schemes in Africa by Atim [39] and Diop [40]
also pointed to similar conclusions.
Although the NHIA in recent times have consistently
expressed concern about the ever increasing claims bill and
its effect on the future financial sustainability of the scheme,
there has been very little research to date on NHIS enrol-
ment with a representative data to ascertain whether
utilization of healthcare by the insured has any effect on
Table 5 Effect of number of health facility visits on NHIS renewal
Years
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Odds Odds Odds Odds Odds
Healthcare Utilization One Visit 1.68*** 2.48*** 1.82*** 1.92*** 2.14***
Two visits 1.61*** 2.90*** 1.86*** 1.86*** 1.76***
Three Visits 1.33 3.51*** 1.88*** 1.86*** 1.65**
Four Visits 2.76 4.67*** 1.93*** 1.95*** 0.70
Five Visits 1.22 4.48*** 1.96*** 1.98*** 0.72
More than Five Visits 6.76*** 1.72*** 2.08***
Sex Male 0.99 0.92*** 0.95*** 0.92*** 0.92***
Age Group Children 1–17 Years 0.99 0.89*** 0.86*** 1.11*** 1.18***
Age 18–39 0.53*** 0.26*** 0.34*** 0.56*** 0.43***
Age 40–59 0.69*** 0.44*** 0.59*** 0.98 0.77***
Age 60+ 0.19*** 0.55*** 0.73*** 1.28*** 0.85***
Exemption Categories Children under 18 Years 0.53*** 0.47*** 0.70*** 0.99 0.74***
70 Years & Above 5.11*** 1.28*** 1.24*** 1.29*** 1.56***
SSNIT Contributor 1.24*** 1.59*** 1.59*** 1.65*** 1.73***
SSNIT Pensioner 5.43*** 1.67*** 2.25*** 2.22*** 2.80***
Indigent 0.67*** 0.27*** 0.44*** 0.62*** 0.94***
Pregnant Woman 1.68*** 1.88*** 1.68*** 1.44*** 1.32***
LEAP 0.33** 1.65** 1.02*** 1.33* 1.15
Region Greater Accra 1.31*** 0.87*** 1.09*** 0.83*** 0.62***
Constant 0.37*** 1.67*** 1.54*** 1.09*** 1.39***
Number of observations 834487 997544 1298711 1644807 1965648
Source: NHIS Enrolment and Utilisation Data for the years 2008 – 2013
Note: Odds ratio are reported with reference Categories, Healthcare Utilization (Did not utilized healthcare in previous year); Sex (Female); Age Group (Babies
under 1 Year); Enrolment Categories (Informal Sector Employees). Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.000
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renewals and whether the problem of adverse selection ex-
ists in the NHIS. This paper provides evidence, suggestive
of the presence of adverse selection in the NHIS. There is
therefore the need for policy makers to put in place mea-
sures to enforce the mandatory enrolment by all people
living in Ghana so as to contain adverse selection.
The analyses contained in this paper are however sub-
ject to the following limitations in the data. The paper
assumes that enrolment in the NHIS begins in January
of any particular year and ends in December of that
same year. Utilization of healthcare in a particular year
was therefore taken as any health facility visit from the
1st January to 31st December of the same year. However,
in reality this may not be the case since an individual
who enrolls in the NHIS in May 2008 will have member-
ship valid up until April 2009 and will have to renew his
membership in May 2009. For the purposes of the
analysis in this paper, this individual is deemed to have
enrolled in 2008, but if he/she does not visit a health fa-
cility between May 2008 and December 2008 but visits a
health facility in February 2009, it is assumed he did not
utilize healthcare during the 2008 enrolment period. If
he/she renews his membership in May 2009 and does
not utilize healthcare for the rest of 2009, his February
2009 health facility visit is taken as healthcare utilization
for the 2009 enrolment period. Any inferences made
from the findings in this paper should therefore be done
with caution taking into consideration the above limita-
tion. Nevertheless, these limitations by no means invali-
date the findings from this paper.
Conclusion
Our analysis of the effect of previous utilization of health-
care and frequency of usage by the insured on the decision
to renew membership using NHIS routine data (2008 –
2013) provides evidence of the presence of adverse selec-
tion in Ghana’s NHIS. Only a very small proportion of the
insured in any given year utilize healthcare. The proportion
of the insured that makes more health facility visits in any
particular year and renew their membership was also found
to be higher than those who do not utilize healthcare and
renew their membership. The likelihood of renewal was
found to be higher for those who utilize healthcare than
those who do not and also higher for those who make more
health facility visits than those who do not.
The existence of adverse selection in the NHIS has the
potential of creating financial sustainability problems since
high risk individuals who self-select into the scheme de-
mand more healthcare services and hence increases the
claims bill. Policy makers should adopt more pragmatic
ways of encouraging low risk individuals to remain en-
rolled in the NHIS by enforcing the mandatory enrolment
and also find sustainable ways of increasing the revenue
base of the scheme. We suggest that effective mechanisms
are put in place to obtain accurate data on income levels
of Ghanaians particularly those in the informal sector of
employment so that NHIS premium levels can be set
based on income levels. We further recommend an up-
ward review of the VAT component to the NHIS fund,
special NHIS tax “Sin Tax” to be charged on luxurious
goods and services such as cigarettes and alcohol and
communication “Talk” tax in the telecommunication sec-
tor to increase the revenue base of the scheme.
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